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The thoughts of the philosopher, William James, have had a 
stirring effect on his own generation and have had continued 
influence up to the present. The versatility of James 
uted to the scope of this influence. James' works are 




and the manner in which he presented his thoughts are all en- 
tirely apart from the tradition. 
James' simplicity in presentation of his thoughts and his 
style are greatly appealing to the reader. Unlike his predeces- 
sors, he wanted not to keep his head in the clouds but to stand 
on solid ground while speculating. James is especially promi- 
attempt to 
get at metaphysical problems through practical means. 
What made James most popular is his interest and enthusiasm 
to explore into every possible area of knowledge. He studied 
medicine, physiology, biology, psychology, and philosophy. He 
attempted to comprehend the complexity of man as a whole from 
physiological, psychological, and philosophical viewpoints. 
James always felt that 
His theory of emotions 
are good illustrations 
physiology and psychology overlapped. 
and his theory of the "will to believe" 
of his endeavor to observe and study man 
from different angles. 
It is interesting to speculate how James attempted to study 
the complexity of man from psychological, physiological, and 
philosophical viewpoints. His theory of emotions is a fair 
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example of his attempt to understand man from psychological and 
physiological points of view. Here he made an attempt to give a 
physiological basis to psychological processes of emotions. The 
theory of the "will to believe" is a good example of James' 
philosophy and a means of comprehending man from another angle. 
I have tried in this report first to interpret his theory of 
emotions and the "will to believe", and then to inquire whether 
there is any relationship between the psychological and philo- 
sophical ideas involved in these two great works. 
JAMES' THEORY OF EMOTIONS 
William James first published his theory of emotions in 
1884.1 He felt that the area of emotions had been neglected by 
the physiologists and took it upon himself to explore this 
sphere. 
The physiologists who, during the past few years, 
have been so industriously exploring the functions of 
the brain, have limited their attempts at explanation 
to its congnitive and volitional performances.... But 
the aesthetic sphere of the mind, its longings, its 
pleasures and pains, and its emotions, have been so 
ignored in all these researches....2 
Before stating his theory of emotions, James made an at- 
tempt to allot a brain -seat to emotions and felt that the proces- 
ses involved in the sensorial part are the same as the ones in- 
volved in emotions, but differently organized. James divided all 
'James, William, Mind, "What is an emotion?", 1884, 9: 
188-2050 
2Ibid., p. 1880 
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feelings of pleasure and displeasure, of excitement and inter- 
est, into two categories - those that have bodily expression and 
those that involve mental processes but do not result in "obvi- 
ous physical expressions. Some bodily sensations or their 
images bring about the latter feelings, without any physical ex- 
pression, because the degree of feeling brought about in these 
situations is not enough to result in bodily expression. Pleas- 
ure and pain found in intellectual activities, also, do not re- 
sult in bodily expression. All this goes to show "that there 
are pleasures and pains inherent in certain forms of nerve - 
action as such, wherever that action occurs."' 
James was primarily concerned with those feelings in which 
there are bodily expressions. In these feelings, the bodily ex- 
pressions result in the experiences of emotions of fear, anger, 
lust, greed, etc., which are mental states. 
The bodily disturbances are said to be the "mani- 
festation" of these several emotions, their "expres- 
sion" or "natural language"; and these emotions them- 
selves, being so strongly characterized both from 
within and without, may be called the standard emo- 
tions.2 
Having explained the above preliminaries, James stated his 
theory thus: 
Our natural way of thinking about these standard 
emotions is that the mental perception of some fact 
excites the mental affection called the emotion, and 
that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily 
expression. My thesis on the contrary is that the 
bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the 
Ibid., p. 189. 
2Loc. cit. 
exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes 
as they occur IS the emotion. Common sense says, we 
lose our fortune, arc sorry and weep; we meet a bear, 
are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, 
are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be de- 
fended says that the order of sequence is incorrect, 
that the one mental state is not immediately induced 
by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first 
be interposed between, and that the more rational 
statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry 
because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not 
that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, 
angry, or fearful as the case may be. Without the 
bodily states following on the perception, the latter 
would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, 
destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the 
bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and 
deem it right to strike, but we could not actually feel 
afraid or angry 01 
To prove this hypothesis, James went further to explain the 
nervous system. Since the nervous system has the inclination to 
react to the environmental stimulus in certain ways it "is but a 
hyphen between determinate arrangements of matter outside the 
body and determinate impulses to inhibition or dischange within 
its organs."2 The actions of living things are in accordance 
with their expectations of the specific features of their envi- 
ronment. If the perceiving of certain events calls forth emo- 
tions, these emotions can be classified as nervous anticipations. 
James acknowledged the complexity involved in the bodily 
changes that accompany emotions. The sensations coming into the 
body cause various physical changes and that is why it is diffi- 
cult to create an emotion under controlled conditions. In the 
case of extreme emotions, bodily changes in skin, liver, bowels, 
lIbid., pp. 189-1900 
2Ibid., p. 190. 
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bladder, functioning of glands, heart beat, are very signifi- 
cant, while in the case of milder emotions they are not so evi- 
dent. In emotions, even the voluntary muscles seem to act in 
accordance with these difficult bodily changes.1 Another thing 
that was important for James is that every bodily change that 
takes place is actually felt at that very moment by the individ- 
ual, either severely or unnoticed. This, he said, can be proved 
by introspecting one's self in an emotional mood.2 
To support his theory, James said a severe emotion could be 
imagined from which all the feelings of the bodily changes could 
be abstracted, when there would not be anything left which could 
be called an emotion and "that a cold and neutral state of in- 
tellectual perception is all that remains."3 James gave many 
illustrations to put this point across. He cited many situa- 
tions in which the people involved could introspect the bodily 
changes taking place after the perception of an exciting fact 
and before the mental state of emotion could take place. For 
example, "If we abruptly see a dark moving form in the woods, 
our heart stops beating, and we catch our breath instantly and 
before any articulate idea of danger can arise."4 
The instances in which James found valuable evidence for 
the precedence of bodily changes over the feeling of emotion, 
are those where people get frightened or angry or sad without 
lIbid., p. 192. 
?Ibid., p. 193. 
41bid o, p. 196. 
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any apparent cause whatsoever. This is mostly found in patho- 
logical cases and it is due to the bodily expression, feeling of 
which is emotion. In these cases: 
...We must suppose the nervous machinery to be so 
"Labile" in some one emotional direction, that almost 
every stimulus, however inappropriate, will cause it 
to upset in that way, and as a consequence to engender 
the particular complex of feelings of which the psychic 
body of the emotion consists. Thus, to take one spe- 
cial instance, if inability to draw deep breath, flut- 
tering of the heart, and that peculiar epigastric 
change felt as "precordial anxiety," with an irresist- 
ible tendency to take a somewhat crouching attitude and 
to sit still, and with perhaps other visceral processes, 
not now known, all spontaneously occur together in a 
certain person; his feeling of their combination IS the 
emotion of dread, and he is the victim of what is known 
as morbid fear.1 
James said that if his hypothesis were true, then it 
clearly showed that the mental life and physical body are closely 
linked.2 He made every effort to prove his hypothesis and be- 
lieved that it is true. Therefore, he also believed that the 
physical sensations of pain and pleasure seemed to have the same 
origin as the feelings of joy, pride, anger, love, etc. 
Having identified the standard emotions, James attempted to 
clarify the feelings which do not have obvious bodily changes, 
namely the aesthetic, intellectual, and moral feelings. These 
feelings seem to give the "pleasure that seems ingrained in the 
very form of the representation itself, and to borrow nothing 
from any reverberation surging up from the parts below the 
brain."3 But James felt that if these feelings are introspected, 
'Ibid., PO 199. 
afETT:, p. 201. 
3Loc. cit. 
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it will be found that most of them are accompanied by not so ob- 
vious bodily changes. Others could result in intellectual emo- 
tion involving no bodily manifestations at all; but these, he 
insisted, are empty and entirely different from "standard" emo- 
tions.1 
Coming back to the physiology of the brain, James wrote: 
If we suppose its cortex to contain centres for 
the perception of changes in each special sense -organ, 
in each portion of the skin, in each muscle, each 
joint, and each viscus, and to contain absolutely 
nothing else, we still have a scheme perfectly capable 
of representing the process of emotions.2 
An object excites the cortical centre, James argued, and an 
idea of the same object takes place in less than a second. 
...The reflex currents pass down through their 
pre -ordained channels, alter the condition of the mus- 
cle, skin and viscus; and these alternatives, apper- 
ceived like the original object, in as many specific 
portions of the cortex, combine with it in conscious- 
ness and transform it from an oNect-simply-apprehended 
into an object -emotionally -felt.-, 
Despite this elaborate statement of the theory of emotions 
and their physiological basis, James felt that\his theory could 
not be put to decisive proof. "It must be confessed that a cru- 
cial test of the truth of the hypothesis is quite as hard to ob- 
tain as its decisive refutation. 114 
In 1890 William James restated his theory in a more organ- 
ized way and with additions. He felt that emotions should not 
libido, p. 202. 
2lbid., p. 203. 
p. 203. 
4Ibid., p. 203. 
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be regarded as entities since they are brought about by general 
causes which are physiological. He based his restatement on the 
physiological investigations made by the Danish scientist, C. 
Lange. 
Prof. C. Lange of Copenhagen published in 1885 a 
physiological theory of their LEhe emotions] contribu- 
tion and conditioning, which I had already broached the 
previous year in an article in Mind. None of the crit- 
icisms which I have heard of it have made me doubt its 
essential truth.' 
Here James called his "standard" emotions the "coarser" 
emotions, and those whose organic changes are not obvious, he 
called the "subtler" emotions02 
James believed that there are any number of emotions and 
that these emotions are felt by the individual in different ways 
because the sensations from which the emotions result, have 
nothing definitely fixed about them. The emotions can be clas- 
sified in any way and every way, but they remain unchanged. The 
typical expression of any emotion cannot be established objec- 
tively. 
In 1894, while defending his theory against many criticisms, 
James wrote: 
In the year 1884 Prof. Lange of Copenhagen and the 
present writer published, independently of each other, 
the same theory of emotional consciousness. They 
affirmed it to be the effect of the organic changes, 
muscular and visceral, of which the so-called texpres- 
siont of the emotion consists. It is thus not a pri- 
mary feeling, directly aroused by the exciting object 
or thought, but a secondary feeling indirectly aroused; 




the primary effect being the organic changes in ques- 
tion, which are immediate reflexes following upon the 
presence of the object.' 
James stated one of the criticisms made by Wundt and an- 
swered it in the following way: 
How insufficient, he says, must Lange's explana- 
tion of emotions from Vaso-motor effects be, when it 
results in making him put joy and anger together in 
one class!, To which I reply both that Lange has laid 
far too great stress on the Vaso-motor factor in his 
explanations, and that he has been materially wrong 
about congestion of the face being the essential fea- 
ture in anger, for in the height of that passion al- 
most every one grows pale - a fact which the expression 
!white with rage! commemorates.2 
THE WILL TO BELIEVE 
William James, in his The Will to Believe, set out with a 
determination to justify beliefs gained through willingness to 
accept them. He started with an aim to justify the situation 
especially in "religious matters." 
He began his treatise with an explanation of certain tech- 
nicalities involved in believing. Anything that can be proposed 
for belief, he called an "hypothesis." If a proposal or hypoth- 
esis seemed to be a "real possibility," he wrote, it is a "live 
hypothesis," but if it does not appeal, then it is a dead hy- 
pothesis. A hypothesis becomes live or dead not because of the 
qualities within the hypothesis but because of the appeal it 
makes to the individual, or because the individual wants to act 
'James, William, "The Physical Basis of Emotion," Psycho- 
logical Review, 1894, 1: p. 516. 
2Loc. cit., p. 517. 
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according to it. If the hypothesis appeals to the individual's 
willingness to act, then it becomes a live hypothesis. Presence 
of will to act means a tendency to believe. 
Decision between two hypotheses James called an "option." 
Options can be living or dead, forced or avoidable, momentous or 
trivial. He called an option genuine when it is forced, living, 
and momentous. 
In a case where both the hypotheses are live ones (ap- 
peal), the option is living. But if either or both hypotheses 
lack appeal then the option is dead. In this context James 
said: "But if I say: 'Be an agnostic or be a Christian,' it is 
otherwise: trained as you are, each hypothesis makes some ap- 
peal, however small, to your belief."1 Here James seemed to 
have meant that it is one's training which enables him to act 
willingly or not act willingly toward an hypothesis. Therefore, 
it is training which presides over one's willingness to act. 
A forced option is one in which the hypotheses proposed in- 
volve a necessary choice. An avoidable option is one in which 
there is no force requiring one to decide between alternatives, 
hence one can get by by choosing something else.2 
Finally James had momentous and trivial options. The mo- 
mentous option involves decision between hypotheses where choice 
of one renders a unique opportunity which might lead to a unique 
success. The choice of the other eliminates this opportunity. 
'James, William, The Will to Believe, p. 3. 
2Ibid., p. 3. 
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In a case where neither of the hypotheses renders unique oppor- 
tunity, the decision between the two is called a trivial option.1 
James said that sometimes our volitional and passional na- 
ture leads us to form opinions and sometimes it seems as if the 
intellect alone is responsible. When the opinions formed through 
the intellect are examined, it looks as if the beliefs it leads 
to are made up of "matters of fact, immediate or remote, as Hume 
said, and relations between ideas which are either there or not 
there for us if we see them so, and which if not there cannot be 
put there by any action of our own."2 
James proceeded to show, in connection with Pascal's wager, 
that even though Pascal makes use of reasoning to create a be- 
lief in Christianity it does not have any effect on those who do 
not already have a tendency to believe in Christianity. There- 
fore, the tendency to believe in Christianity should be present 
for a proposal to create such a belief. The tendencies to be- 
lieve (passional tendencies) should be there first for a belief 
to come about, and only after the belief is formed do intellec- 
tuals logical, and rational evidences enter in. Therefore the 
intellect alone, he concluded, is not the manufacturer of be- 
liefs but the volitional and passional natures are also respon- 
sible.3 
In the case of the physical sciences, it seems that these 
sciences in trying their best to get at the facts objectively, 
lIbid., P. 4. 
Ibid., p. 5. 
3Ibido, pp, .560 
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disregard subjective elements entirely. James said that it is 
very good to aim at being objective; but that whenever the goal 
of objectivity runs counter to free will and volition it will 
have very insignificant claims to belief, for "intellectual in- 
sight" and pure reason unaided cannot support beliefs.' It is 
seen that our willing nature is a necessary factor. Dead hy- 
potheses are irrelevant since these are dead because they do not 
appeal to our willing nature. 
Our willing nature consists of such "deliberate volitions 
as may have set up habits of belief that we cannot now escape 
from"2 and also prejudice, passion, fear, hope, imitation, and 
partisanship. Most of the time it is not known how or why we 
believe, only the experience of believing is known. In fact the 
person who holds a belief has much less insight into its causes 
than does the person who does not believe it. It is the "pres- 
tige of opinions" which makes one believe, rather than real in- 
sight. Under these conditions a person is satisfied with a few 
reasons for his belief, in case his belief is criticized. Here 
authority and convention play a great part because a person 
tends to believe in what others believe. The very assumption 
that there is truth and that the mind can get at it is a "pas- 
sionate affirmation of desire"3 and is authoritarian. This de- 
sire to have truth and our efforts to find it have no logical 
basis. They represent simply a desire to make an assumption and 
iIbid., pp. 7-8. 
Ibid., p. 9. 
3Loc. cit. 
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to be willing to go along with it.1 
Again, according to James, we believe in only the things 
that are useful to us. Even in cases where there might be some 
evidence leading to a belief, if that belief is not useful, then 
that opinion is not held, though sometimes it may be "suppressed 
and concealed. "2 
This shows that the passional nature, which is non-intel- 
lectual, does direct our opinions and beliefs. Actually the vo- 
litions and passional tendencies cause beliefs and the intellec- 
tual insight and reasoning come only after the belief. This 
works well only when our passional tendencies incline in the 
same direction as our insight and reasoning. Therefore, James 
concluded, our beliefs are not brought about by insight and rea- 
soning alone. 
The assumption that there is truth and that it is the pur- 
pose of the mind to get it, is passional and also dogmatic. But 
it can be held in the empiricist's way or in the absolutist's 
way. The absolutist says "that we not only can attain to know- 
ing truth, but we can KNOW WHEN we have attained to knowing it; 
while the empiricists think that although we may attain it, we 
cannot infallibly know when."3 There are thus different degrees 
of dogmatism in empiricism and absolutism, since the former just 
simply know a thing, while the latter knows when it knows a 
thing. 
'Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
Ibid., p. 10. 
3Ibid., p. 12. 
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James wrote that the history of opinions goes to show that 
the empiricist tendency was prevalent in science, while the ab- 
solutist tendency was prevalent in philosophy. Every system in 
philosophy has treated its own system as a representation of ab- 
solute truth. This absolutist tendency finds expression in the 
doctrine of "objective evidence" of the scholastic orthodoxy. 
But "objective evidence," in one form or another, plays a role 
in every philosophic system. Regarding this contention, James 
stated: 
...You believe in objective evidence, and I do. 
Of some things we feel that we are certain: we knows 
and we know that we do know. There is something that 
gives a click inside of us, a bell that strikes twelve, 
when the hands of the mental clock have swept the dial 
and meet over the meridian hour. The greatest empiri- 
cists among us are only empiricists on reflection: 
when left to their they dogmatise like in- 
fallible popes. When the Cliffords tell us how sinful 
it is to be Christians on such 'insufficient evidence,' 
insufficiency is really the last thing they have in 
mind. For them the evidence is absolutely sufficient, 
only it makes the other way. They believe so com- 
pletely in an anti-Christian order of the universe that 
there is no living optioi: Christianity is a dead hy- 
pothesis from the start. 
James said that since all are "absolutists by instinct" 
this must be regarded as a weakness of nature; but men should 
try not to be slaves to it. He thought that objective evidence 
and certitude, though very good ideals, are not found in any- 
thing. As far as the theory of knowledge is concerned, James 
felt that he was an empiricist. The "opinions grow more true,"2 
if we go on experiencing and thinking about all that we experience. 
1Ibid.; pp. 13-14. 
Ibid., p. 14. 
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When a belief is found it is a mistake to cling to it with an 
attitude that it will never be changed; and for James evidence 
that this is a mistake appears in the whole history of philoso- 
phy. The only truth that James shared with pyrrhonistic scepti- 
cism was "the truth that the present phenomenon of consciousness 
exists."1 Acceptance of the phenomena of consciousness is the 
first step towards the gaining of knowledge. It is "the mere 
admission of a stuff to be philosophized about."2 All the dif- 
ferent philosophies attempted to discover what this stuff is, 
and this had been a chief bone of contention among them. There 
had never been a way to state that a certain thing is true, 
since what was true for one was held to be false by another. 
The ideal of objective evidence had never worked perfectly. Now 
to say that some truths possess this objective evidence is 
merely to say that that is what one wants to see in them. So 
one does see that and then one says that he has objective evi- 
dence. To believe that the evidence that is made use of is ob- 
jective, is "only one more subjective opinion added to the lot."3 
No absolutist seems to have realized that intellect, being di- 
rectly in contact with "truth," could be capable of erring in 
knowing whether it really is truth or not." 
Now while the doctrine of objective certitude is given up 
by us as empiricists, the search for hope and truth is not given 
p. 15. 
Ibid., p. 15. 
3Ibid., p. 16. 
4Ibid., pp. 14-16. 
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up. One can still believe that it exists and that through ex- 
perience and reflection truth grows more and more. The differ- 
ence between scholastic orthodoxy and James' philosophy, in 
James' opinion, is that the strength of the former's "system 
lies in the principles, the origin, the terminus a quo of 
thought," while the latter's "strength is in the outcome, the 
upshot, the terminus ad quem."1 For James the origin is not im- 
portant, but where anything leads to, is important. 
It matters not to an empiricist from what quarter 
an hypothesis may come to him: he may have acquired 
it by fair means or by foul; passion may have whispered 
or accident suggested it; but if the total drift of 
thinking continues to confirm it, that is what he means 
by its being true.2 
In our concern for opinions there are two different ways of 
proceeding: "ways entirely different, and yet ways about whose 
difference the theory of knowledge seems hitherto to have shown 
very little concern.... We must know the truth and we must 
avoid error."3 These have been the most important laws to be 
adhered to by those who want to know. James felt that these two 
great laws are distinct. They are not just two ways of assert- 
ing the same law. Whenever a truth is believed we would likely 
avoid believing a falsehood, but by not believing a falsehood we 
do not thereby believe in a truth. On the contrary, while dis- 
believing a falsehood, we might believe other falsehoods or we 
might not believe anything, not even the truth. James criticized 




the view, "better go without belief forever than believe a 
lie."1 He felt that it was not too bad after all to be duped by 
error and proposed that a certain amount of risk should be 
taken. 
After having explained these preliminaries, James stated 
his thesis thus: 
I have said, and now repeat it, that not only as 
a matter of fact do we find our passional nature influ- 
encing us in our opinions, but that there are some op- 
tions between opinions in which this influence must be 
regarded both as an inevitable and as a lawful determi- 
nant of our choice.2 
James said that the two laws, believing the truth and 
avoiding error, are themselves assumptions made on the basis of 
passional nature. In cases where the decision between gaining 
the truth and losing it is not momentous, one may wait until 
evidence comes and by not taking the opportunity of gaining 
truth, avoid believing falsehood. In human activities in gen- 
eral and in science there is no urgency to act, but in the deci- 
sions of law courts there is. In the case of objective nature, 
we have to believe what we see and questions of truth do not 
arise as momentous options. All the propositions here are only 
trivial options. Since the options are not forced, here it is 
better to propose the "attitude of sceptical balance"3 if we can 
avoid mistakes. It is better not to make options but be consid- 
ering all the reasons "indifferently." 




This indifference cannot be maintained, however, in 
attempts to make discoveries. Science would not have been ad- 
vanced if the scientists were indifferent in this way and did not 
have the "passionate desire" to get the evidence to orove their 
own beliefs. Scientists being interested in proving what they 
believe in, are eager to avoid deception. And this attitude of 
the scientist has been organized into a technique known as the 
"method of verification."1 The scientists uphold this method so 
very highly that sometimes it is doubtful whether they care for 
the truth as such. They are interested in the truth which is 
gained by this method. Even if the truth is obvious, they have 
to get this truth only through verification. Since the human 
passions are stronger than rules (here the method of verifica- 
tion), scientists always prove what they are interested in. Tn 
decisions where the option is not forced, our idea should be to 
be able to decide with disinterested intellect, but in forced 
options the passional nature enters in. When there is a forced 
option, one does not sit and wait for the evidence but acts 
according to his passional tendencies. 
Moral questions, according to James, deal with what is good 
and what will be good. Their "solution cannot wait for sensible 
proof."2 To find the values of all that exists and does not ex- 
ist, one has to consult his heart since science cannot tell us 
about that. "Science herself consults her heart when she lays 
2Ibid., p. 2l. 
Ibid., p. 22. 
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it down that the infinite ascertainment of fact and correction 
of false belief are the supreme goods for man. "l Science proves 
this by illustrating how these bring man more benefits, "which 
man's heart in turn declares."2 Our will decides whether we 
should have moral beliefs or not. "If your heart does not want 
a world of moral reality, your head will assuredly never make 
you believe in one."3 For some people moral hypotheses never 
seem to appeal and in the company of such people the moralists 
always feel uncomfortable. 
Moral scepticism can no more be refuted or proved 
by logic than intellectual scepticism can. When we 
stick to it that there is truth (be it of either kind), 
we do so with our whple natures and resolve to stand or 
fall by the results.4 
In the area of personal relations, whether the truth exists 
or does not exist depends on one's desires. If we desire its 
existence, then it exists and vice versa. In any kind of group 
each individual begins to do his work with an anticipation that 
the others will do the same thing. "Wherever a desired result 
is achieved by the cooperation of many independent persons, its 
existence as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive 
faith in one another of those immediately concerned."5 In per- 
sonal relations, it can be seen that many facts owe their exist- 
ence to a belief that they do exist. 
'Loc. cit. 
2E -o -C: cit. 
p. 23. 
I--Loc. cit. 
2Ibid 0, p 2), . 
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And where faith in a fact can help create the 
fact, that would be an insane logic which should say 
that faith running ahead of scientific evidence is the 
'lowest kind of immorality' into which a thinking be- 
ing can fall of 
All this James stated in defense of his thesis: "In truths 
dependent on our personal action, then, faith based on desire is 
certainly lawful and possibly an indispensable thing."2 The 
most important of all questions is the question of religious 
faith, which lays emphasis on everlasting things, passes the 
final judgment over everything, and assures us of a better life 
if we believe in these. Assuming that this is true, the "logi- 
cal elements" this assumption involves may be considered. To be 
able to consider this question, it must offer a living option. 
To those for whom it is a living option, religion comes as a 
momentous option. Whether we should gain through belief or lose 
through non -belief offers a forced option. In this situation we 
cannot escape by being sceptical and looking for the evidence to 
come, because if religion is untrue, we try to avoid error. But 
if it is true, we lose the good as if we had chosen to disbelieve 
it. By being sceptical one is not avoiding the decision but is 
choosing a special kind of risk. "Better risk the loss of the 
truth than the chance of error."3 The sceptic is taking as much 
a chance as a believer is and is making a choice as much as a 
believer. In case of religious hypotheses, if scepticism ad- 
vises us to wait till "sufficient evidence" is obtained, then it 
2Ibid, p. 25. 
Loc. cit. 
3Ibid., p. 26. 
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is trying to say that it is wiser for us to be afraid of error 
than be hopeful that such hypotheses are true. Here, therefore, 
scepticism is not promoting the cause of intellect against pas- 
sions but proposing a different passion as the basis of intel- 
lect. "Dupery for dupery, what proof is there that dupery 
through hope is so much worse than dupery through fear?"1 
All this leads toward considering religion as a live hy- 
pothesis on the assumption that it is a kind of truth. "The 
more perfect and the more eternal aspect of the universe is rep- 
resented in our religions as having personal form."2 This makes 
opposition to religious faith sound unreasonable. To the reli- 
gious, the universe is something sacred, and all relations be- 
tween individuals are felt here. In spite of the fact that peo- 
ple are "passive portions of the universe,"3 in a sense, they 
also have an inclination to act as independent entities. It is 
also felt by them that religion appeals to their "own active 
good will"4 and wants them to meet it half way before any evi- 
dence is given - 
...one who should shut himself up in snarling 
logicality and try to make the gods extort his recog- 
nition willy-nilly, or not get it at all, might cut 
himself off forever from hip, only opportunity of mak- 
ing the gods' acquaintance. 
This feeling that there might be a god with its unknown 
source, forces people to believe in the existence of gods and 
'Ibid., p. 27. 
2Loco cit. 




this in return makes them feel that they are "doing the universe 
the deepest service"1 and all this comes as potential essence of 
the religious hypothesis. 
If the hypothesis were true in all its parts, in- 
cluding this one, then pure intellectualism, with its 
veto on our making willing advances, would be an ab- 
surdity; and some participation of our sympathetic na- 
ture would be logically required. I, therefore, for 
one, cannot see my way to accepting the agnostic rules 
for truth -seeking, or willfully agree to keep my will- 
ing nature out of the game .2 
James felt that in spite of all this argument in favor of 
having the right to believe any live hypothesis that appeals to 
the will, if there are some who do not go by this, it is because 
they have been thinking about some specific religious hypothesis 
and not examining it "from the abstract logical point of view."3 
Any option which is living to a person does not seem silly to 
him, and here the freedom to believe can legitimately decide the 
option if intellect can not. When James looked at all the prac- 
tical and theoretical possibilities that the religious question 
involves for concrete men, he felt that it was ridiculous to 
wait for evidence until the end of life, refusing to believe ac- 
cording to our passional nature. Scholastic absolutists might 
wait for this evidence, since they would know when this evidence 
comes. But empiricists will not know when they have the evi- 
dence, therefore for empiricists there is no point in waiting 
for such evidence to come and refusing to believe until then04 
1Loc. cit. 
2.11337., p. 28. 
Ibid., p. 29. 
Ibid., pp. 29-300 
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In conclusion James advised that each one has a right to 
believe the way he does, that he should not criticize but re- 
spect the mental freedom of others. This leads to tolerance, in 
which empiricism's pride lies. He endorsed the remarks of a 
contemporary author, Fitz -James Stephen, about important ques- 
tions in life: 
They are riddles of the Sphinx, and in some way or 
another we must deal with them.... In all important 
transactions of life we have to take a leap in the 
dark.... If we decide to leave the riddle unanswered, 
that is a choice; if we waver in our answer, that, too, 
is a choice; but whatever choice we make, we make it at 
our perilol 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THEORY OF EMOTIONS AND 
"THE WILL TO BELIEVE" 
In his theory of emotions, William James made a distinction 
between two different ways of thinking, the natural way and the 
rational way, and he chose to follow the rational way of think- 
ing about the emotions. 
Our natural way of thinking about these coarser 
emotions is that the mental perception of some fact 
excites the mental affection called the emotion, and 
that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily 
expression. The hypothesis here to be defended says 
that this order of seauence is incorrect,... and that 
the more rational statement is that we feel sorry be- 
cause we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because 
we tremble, 
Contradicting his choice of the rational method in the 
theory of emotions, James maintains in The Will to Believe that 
the opinion arrived at through our natural tendency to believe 
lIbid., p. 300 
2 -James, William, The Principles of Psychology, 2: Y19-4500 
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in an opinion has a right to be believed and also can be justi- 
fied. 
...that not only as a matter of fact do we find 
our passional nature influencing us in our opinions, 
but that there are some options between opinions in 
which this influence must be regarded both as an inev- 
itable and as a lawful determinant of our choice.1 
James seemed to renounce the common-sense view and natural 
way of thinking and championed the rational way of stating the 
theory of emotions, but in his The Will to Believe he gave pri- 
mary concern to our passional nature and belief through what 
comes naturally, giving only secondary concern to reasoning and 
insight. Also when the question of what brings about a person's 
beliefs and emotions is considered in The Will to Believe James 
seemed to rule out the intellectual altogether. Regarding the 
production of opinions, he seemed to say that it is the tendency 
or the desire to believe that determines these opinions and not 
the intellect and logic. 
Evidently, then, our non-intellectual nature does 
influence our convictions. There are passional tenden- 
cies and volitions which run before and others which 
come after belief, and it is only the latter that are 
too late for the fair; ...and pure insight and logic, 
whatever they might do ideally, ar not the only things 
that really do produce our creeds.' 
In the theory of emotions, James argues that the emotions, 
being mental, are not caused by a mental state of perception but 
by physiological changes. 
The hypothesis here to be defended says that this 
order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental 
'James, William, The Will to Believe, p. 19. 
2Ibid., p. 11. 
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state is not immediately induced by the other, that the 
bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, 00 
Now the general causes of the emotions are indubi- 
tably physiological.' ...If we fancy some strong emo- 
tion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of 
it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we 
have nothing left behind, no tmind-stufft out of which 
emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral 
state of intellectual perception is all that remains.3 
Thus James seems to believe that both the opinions and emo- 
tions are caused directly by something physiological or natural 
in man and not by the mental processes. The passional nature 
which brings forth opinions seems to be analogous with the phys- 
iological processes that bring about the emotions, while opin- 
ions and emotions being mental states and caused by physiologi- 
cal processes, are analogous with each other for James. There- 
fore, passional nature is to opinions what physiological proces- 
ses are to emotions. 
For William James, the only truth that nobody could ques- 
tion or doubt seemed to be the experience or consciousness of a 
thing existing. In The Will to Believe James expresses this 
view thus: 
But in our dealings with objective nature we ob 
viously are recorders, not makers, of the truth, 
The consciousness comes through experiences or sensations. 
This is where knowledge seems to get started, and only this 
2James, William, The Principles of Psychology, p. 449. 
p. 451. 
4James, William, The Will to Believe, p. 20. 
1 James, William, "What is an Emotion?", Mind, 1884, 9: 189. 
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seemed to be the unchangeable truth for James. It seems that 
there is a parallel to this idea in James' theory of emotions. 
If such a theory is true, then each emotion is 
the resultant of a sum of elements, and each element 
is caused by a physiological process of a sort already 
well known. The elements are all organic changes, and 
each of them is the reflex effect of the exciting ob- 
ject.1 
Both in the theory of emotions and in The Will to Believe 
there seem to be tendencies of realism. The whole theory of 
emotion is based on realism. "My theory, on the contrary, is 
that the bodily changes followed directly the perception of the 
exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they 
occur IS the emotion."2 For James, the mental status of emotion 
started with the perception of the object. Therefore, the world 
of objects is already there even before the mind can perceive 
it. The same thought can be traced in James' The Will to Be- 
lieve. 
...Throughout the breadth of physical nature facts 
are what they are quite independently of us and seldom 
is there any such hurry about them that the,risks of 
believing a premature theory need be faced. 
The existence of the world does not seem to depend on the 
mind. The mind cannot change anything that is in the world. 
Here James seems to espouse realism. 
As in the theory of emotions, so also in The Will to Be- 
lieve the mind -body dualism seems to be rejected. In the theory 
of emotions, James combined the mental and the physical. He 
1James, William, Principles of Psychology, 2: 453. 
2Ibid., p. )1)19. 
3James, ODo Cit., p. 20. 
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considered mind and body to be continuous with each other and 
not to be two different entities. 
If our hypothesis is true, it makes us realize 
more deeply than ever how much our mental life is knit 
up with our corporeal frame, in the strictest sense of 
the term. Rapture, love, ambition, indignation, and 
pride, considered as feelings, are fruits of the same 
sort with the grossest bodily sensations of pleasure 
and of pain.1 
James said that if his theory of emotions were true, it 
clearly showed that the mental life and the physical life are 
closely linked. In presenting his theory, he made every attempt 
to prove it and believed that it was true. Thereby he seems to 
have assumed that physical and mental life are linked together. 
A parallel can be found to this in The Will to Believe where 
James rules out "pure intellectualism" when one is forming one's 
beliefs. 
...Then pure intellectualism, with its veto on 
making willing advances, would be an absurdity; and 
some participation of our sympathetic nature would be 
logically required.2 
Although the mental and the physical are interrelated for 
James, the mental states seem to depend on the physical for 
their origin. According to James, it is probable that mental 
states cannot exist as separate entities. 
After studying James' theory of emotions and The Will to 
Believe, one begins to suspect that the theory of emotions and 
The Will to Believe are interdependent. The theory of emotions 
can well have been a project inspired by and sustained by James' 
'James, William,. The Principles of Psychology, 2: 467. 
2James, William, The Will to Believe, p. 28. 
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own "will to believe" and The Will to Believe itself may be sim- 
ply a formal statement of the method James used, perhaps uncon- 
sciously, in developing the theory of emotions. For any proposal 
which appeals to the will was for James a live hypothesis: 
Let us give the name of hypothesis to anything 
that may be proposed to our belief.... A live hypoth- 
esis is one which appeals as a real possibility to him 
to whom it is proposedLl 
James, when he proposed his thesis on emotions, seemed to 
have felt this appeal to believe in his theory of emotions. 
Thus it can be said that it was a live hypothesis for him. "The 
best thing I can say for it is, that in writing it, I have al- 
most persuaded myself it may be true."2 Here one might see the 
tendency to believe that is so very important for James in the 
process that brings about beliefs. This theory of emotions was 
a live hypothesis for James, while it was a dead hypothesis for 
others. 
The physiologists who, during the past few years, 
have been so industriously exploring the functions of 
the brain, have limited their attempts at explanation 
to its cognitive and volitional performances. ...But 
the aesthetic sphere of the mind, its longings, its 
pleasures and pains, and its emotions, have been so 
ignored in all these researches that one is tempted to 
suppose that if either Dr. Ferrier or Dr. Munk were 
asked for a theory in loain-terms of the latter mental 
facts, they might both reply, either that they had as 
yet bestowed no thought upon the subject, or that they 
had found it so difficult to make distinct hypotheses, 
that the matter lay for them among the problems of the 
future, only to be taken up after the simpler one of 
the present should have been definitively solved.-, 
libido, p. 20 
2:771, William, Mind, 1884, p. 205. 
3Ibid., p. 188. 
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The same hypothesis is live for James, while it is dead for 
other physiologists because James might have been willing to act 
while the men he mentions above were not. As James remarks in 
another connection, "This shows that deadness and liveness in an 
hypothesis are not intrinsic properties, but relations to the 
individual thinker. 
act."1 
In the theory of emotion, regarding the succession of the 
mental and physical states involved in an emotions James was 
confronted with two propositions: first of all, that a mental 
state can bring about another mental state, and, secondly, that 
one mental state cannot bring about another mental state. 
They are measured by his willingness to 
The hypothesis here to be defended says that this 
that 
state is not immediately induced by the other, that 
the bodily manifestations must first be interposed be- 
tween 
Both of these propositions seemed to have appealed to James 
and so were live hypotheses; they offered him a living option. 
"A living option is one in which both hypotheses are live ones."3 
He also seemed to have felt the force that he must choose be- 
tween them. This feeling is evident from his theory of emo- 
tions, and he made the option a forced one. 
But if I say, 'Either accept this truth or go 
without it,' I put on you a forced option, for there 
is no standing place outside of the alternative. Every 
dilemma based on a complete logical disjunction, with 
1 James, William, The Will to Relieve, pp. 2-3. 
2James, William, The Principles of Philosophy, 2: 450. 
3James, William, The Will to Believe, p. 3. 
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no possibility of not choosing, is an option of this 
kind.' 
Since the other physiologists did not attempt to make a 
study of emotions,2 James seemed to have felt that either he 
should present a theory of emotions or none would be offered. 
This convinced him that the option was momentous. 
...for this would probably be your only similar 
opportunity, and your choice now would either exclude 
you from the North Pole sort of immortality altogether 
or put at least the chance of it into your hands. 
Since the option between the two propositions in James' 
theory of emotion seemed to be living, forced and momentous, it 
was a genuine option. 
One of the several ways in which James seemed to allow be- 
lief is through simple perception. Here the subjective elements 
do not seem to take any part. 
We can say any of these things, but we are abso- 
lutely impotent to believe them; and of just such 
things is the whole fabric of the truths that we do 
believe in made up, - matters of fact, immediate or 
remote, as Hume said, and relations between ideas, 
which are either there or not there for us if we see 
them so, and which if pot there cannot be put there by 
any action of our own04 
In such cases where the belief is dependent entirely on 
perception, no human desires, wishes, and emotions seem to be 
present. Here the beliefs seem to be purely objective. Beliefs 
which are gained purely through perception may be compared with 
what James called aesthetic emotion at its primary level. 
-Loc. cit., p. 3. 
2Refer to page 28. 
James, op. cit., P. 4. 
James, William, The Will to Believe, P. 5. 
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In reply to this we immediately insist that aes- 
thetic emotion, pure and simple, the pleasure given us 
by certain lines and masses, and combinations of colors 
and sounds, is an absolutely sensational experience, an 
optical or auricular feeling that is primary, and not 
due to the repercussion backwards of other sensations 
elsewhere consecutively aroused.1 
Beliefs which are gained through simple perception seemed 
to be the only instances where the passional nature did not seem 
to affect the beliefs, as the aesthetic emotion only at its pri- 
mary stage seemed to be purely intellectual - lacking any physi- 
cal expressions. They both seem to involve the same kind of 
mechanism - simply recording the facts or 
kind of subjective reaction. 
James in The Will to Believe, felt that no beliefs 
images, without any 
can be 
gained through pure intellectual insight. He was very sure that 
subjective elements do enter and have to enter into our opinions. 
Yet if any one should thereupon assume that in- 
tellectual insight is what remains after wish and will 
and sentimental preference have taken wing, or that 
pure reason is what then settles our opinions, he would 
fly quite as directly in the teeth of the facts.2 
In fact, for James, the subjective element of the passional 
nature produces beliefs, and the intellect and reasoning have 
very little to say. 
There are passional tendencies and volitions which 
run before and others which come after belief, and it 
is only the latter that are too late for the fair;....3 
It is possible that this is what happened in the case of 
James, theory of emotions. He seemed to have a natural tendency 
/James, William, The Principles of. Psychology, 2: 468. 
James, op. cit., p. 8. 
p. 11 
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to believe in his theory even before it was put to positive 
proof 
. 
Thus will the publication of my articles have 
been justified, even though the theory it advocates, 
rigorously taken, be erroneous. The best thing I can 
say for it is, that in writing it, I have almost per- 
suaded myself it may be true. 
Here he does not only seem to show his passional tendency 
to believe, but he also seemed to go by what he later believed 
in regard to the avoidance of error and the knowing of truth. 
Clifford, in the instructive passage which I have 
quoted, exhorts us to the latter course. Believe noth- 
ing, he tells us, keep your mind in suspense forever, 
rather than by closing it on insufficient evidence in- 
cur the awful risk of believing lies. You, on the 
other hand, may think that the risk of being in error 
is a very small matter when compared with the blessings 
of real knowledge, and be ready to be duped many times 
in your investigation rather than postpone indefinitely 
the chance of guessing true. I myself find it impossi- 
ble to go with Clifford.2 
Dupery for dupery, what proof is there that dupery 
through hope is so much worse than dupery through fear? 
I, for one, can see no proof; and I simply refuse obedi- 
ence to the scientistst command to imitate his kind of 
option, in a case where my own stake is important enough 
to give me the right to choose my own form of risk.3 
James seemed to prove that "dupery through hope" is better 
than "dupery through fear" and took the risk in presenting his 
theory of emotions. 
In his The Will to Believe, James seemed to have felt that 
"objective evidence" is a very nice ideal to have but that no- 
body could be completely objective. He felt that scholastic 
1James, Williams "What is an Emotion?", Mind, 1884, 9: 205. 
2James, William, The Will to Believe, p. 18. 
3Ibid., p. 27. 
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orthodoxy made an attempt to get at truth through "objective 
evidence," while the scientists tried to use the method of veri- 
fication to get at truth. James felt that science and the scho- 
lastic theorists looked only for the evidence that they needed 
to prove their hypotheses and that they were never completely 
objective. 
"Objective evidence and certitude are doubtless 
very fine ideals to play with, but where on this moon- 
lit and dream 
-visited planet are they found?"1 
The much lauded objective evidence is never tri- 
umphantly there; it is a mere aspiration or Grenzbegriff, 
marking the infinitely remote ideal of our thinking life. 
To claim that certain truths now possess it, is simply 
to say that when you think them true, and they are trues 
then their evidence is objective, otherwise it is not. 
But practically one's conviction that the evidence one 
goes by is of the real objective brand, is only one more 
subjective opinion added to the lot. For what a con- 
tradictory array of opinions have objective evidence and 
absolute certitude been claimedt2 
It is possible that since James rejected objective certi- 
tude, he may have paid too little attention to the evidence that 
some of the physiologists came up with in regard to his physio- 
logical basis of emotions. James inquired of Dr. Strumpell re- 
garding his case of total anaesthesia, asking him whether the 
grief and shame felt by the patient were "real feelings" in his 
mind or whether they were only physical manifestations to which 
the patient was insensible but which the observer could notice.3 
In reply to this, Dr. Strumpell stated: 
lIbid., p. 14. 
2Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
3James, William, "What is an Emotion?", Mind, 1884, 9: 204. 
3L 
...Nevertheless I think I can decidedly make the 
statement, that he was by no means completely lacking 
in emotional affections. In addition to the feelings 
of grief and shame mentioned in my paper, I recall dis- 
tinctly that he showed e.g., anger, and frequently 
quarrelled with the hospital attendants. He also mani- 
fested fear lest I should punish him. In short, I do 
not think that my case speaks exactly in favour of your 
theory. On the other hand, I will not affirm that it 
positively refutes your theory. 
When James received this reply, he went ahead to find the 
evidence that he needed. He could be said to have had a strong 
tendency to believe in his hypothesis. 
. 0i s it not, I say, at least possible, that Dr. 
Strumpell, addressing no direct introspective questions 
to his patient, and the patient not being of a class 
from which one could expect voluntary revelations of 
that sort, should have similarly omitted to discrimi- 
nate between a feeling and its habitual motor accompa- 
niment, and erroneously taken the latter as proof that 
the former was there?2 
This might indicate that James did not have very much faith 
in objective evidence but believed in introspection. He seemed 
to have felt that if the boy had been asked to introspect him- 
self, his feelings would have proved the theory. In The Will to 
Believe James seemed to trade objective evidence for experience. 
I live, to be sure, by the practical faith that 
we must go on experiencing and thinking over our ex- 
perience, for only thus can our opinions grow more 
true; but to hold any one of them - I absolutely do 
not care which - as if it never could be reinterpre- 
table or corrigible, I believe to be a tremendously 
mistaken attitude, and I think that the whole history 
of philosophy will bear me outo3 
1Ibid., p. 205. 
2Loc. cit. 
3James, William, The Will to Believe, P. 140 
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All the foregoing relationships between James' theory of 
emotions and the theory of the will to believe illustrate that 
the former's proof is at least partially dependent on the lat- 
ter. The theory of emotions gets much of its strength and sup- 
port from The Will to Believe and cannot stand by itself. James 
made use of his will to believe in proving the theory of emo- 
tions, at the expense of objective evidence. He believed in his 
theory of emotions because of his passional nature. The Will to 
Believe is his theory of getting at a belief while his theory of 
emotions is the belief that he got by applying his theory. 
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The varied interests of the philosopher, William James,led 
the author to inquire whether Jamest thoughts ran parallel to 
each other or not, in his philosophy and in other fields of 
knowledge that he was interested in. In order to determine 
this, James' theory of emotions and The Will to Believe were 
selected from his psychology and philosophy respectively. In 
this report an attempt is made to decide what relationships, if 
any at all, exist between the theory of emotions and the doc- 
trine of the will to believe. 
First of all interpretation of the theory of emotions and 
The Will to Believe was attempted. Later different ideas pre- 
sented in the theory of emotions were compared with those in The 
Will to Believe. 
James' main purpose in The Will to Believe was to show that 
beliefs or opinions are determined by the passional nature or 
the desire to believe and that it is rightful for opinions to be 
formed that way. This main idea supports the theory of emotions, 
since the latter did not have very much of objective evidence. 
This suggested that it was the passional nature in James that 
led him to believe his theory of emotions. 
In The Will to Believe James considered objective evidence 
only as an ideal which at times can be closely approximated. In 
his theory of emotions he tended to neglect objective evidence 
and sought to use introspection as a method. He applied the 
subjective method to his hypothesis in the theory of emotions 
long before he propounded it officially in The Will to Believe. 
2 
The theory of emotions got most of its strength and support 
from James' "will to believe." The theory in The Will to Be- 
lieve merely elaborates and explicates a working hypothesis ly- 
ing behind the theory of emotions. The theory of emotions and 
The Will to Believe are thus very closely related, representing 
as they do two expressions of the same philosophical principle. 
